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Abstract
Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) established some interesting yet puzzling results regard-
ing bidders’ preferences between auction formats. The finding is that bidders strongly prefer the
ascending to the first price sealed bid auction on a ceteris paribus basis but they are not willing
to pay up to an entry price for entering into an ascending auction instead of a first price that
would equalize the profits between the two. While it was found that risk aversion on the part
of the bidders could resolve this anomaly the claim that risk aversion drives overbidding in first
price auctions is somewhat controversial. In this study we examine two competing explanations
for the observed behavior; loss aversion and “clock aversion”, i.e. a dislike for some aspect of
the clock based bidding mechanism. We find that neither alternative explanation can account
for bidders’ auction choice behavior leaving risk aversion as the only un-falsified hypothesis.
JEL Codes: C91, D44
Key Words: bidder preferences, private values, sealed bid auctions, ascending auctions
1 Introduction
The answer of the question how bidders choose to enter one auction versus an alternative competing
auction is important to understand in providing a complete picture of the nature of endogenous
entry decisions into auctions. The issue of how a bidder chooses which among alternative auctions
to enter as well as whether to enter an auction at all is of substantial importance to auctioneers
attempting to attract bidders to their auction. There is a growing literature addressing issues
in endogenous entry in auctions. There are several papers such as Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993),
Pevnitskaya (2004) and Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2004) that consider the decision of whether to
enter an auction or not and study the effect of endogenous entry on bidding behavior. There is a
much larger group such as Harstad (1990), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), Levin and Smith (1994),
McAfee (1993) and McAfee and McMillan (1987) that consider competition between auctioneers
in which the auctioneers are competing along some characteristic such as entry price. We consider
the case in which auctioneers may be competing with each other based on the choice of auction
mechanism. Our interest is in the degree to which the auction mechanism itself might impact the
∗We are grateful for helpful comments to Elmar Wolfstetter and seminar participants at the GEW Jahrestagung
2005. Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB Transregio 15, (“Governance and Efficiency
as Economic Systems”), is gratefully acknowledged. Complete sets of instructions for the experiments in this paper
are available upon request to the authors.
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entry decisions of potential bidders. Of course there would be a direct pecuniary impact of the
mechanism in that bidders should be more likely to enter auction mechanisms that they believe
allow them to get lower prices but there may be other cognitive issues in regard to the structure of
the mechanism that may also impact the choice behavior.
In Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) (ISS) we introduced an experimental design aimed at
eliciting and measuring preferences subjects might possess for different auction institutions and
applied the design to testing bidder preferences between ascending (a dynamic mechanism) and
sealed bid first price auctions (a static mechanism). It seems reasonable to expect bidders to have
preferences between these two auction mechanisms due to the strategic differences between them.
In a first price auction the winner pays a price equal to his own bid whereas in the ascending auction
he pays a price that is an increment above the second highest bid. These differences might result
in difficulty of deciding how to bid and in the possibility of experiencing some form of regret.1
The design involved having subjects make a choice between entering into a two bidder sealed
bid auction versus a two bidder ascending auction, each with different entry prices. By varying
the entry prices, we could measure the subjects’ willingness to pay for either auction. Our main
finding in the paper was that while subjects exhibited strong preferences for the ascending auction
at equal entry prices, they were not willing to pay up to the expected profit difference between the
two auctions to participate in an ascending auction. Thus they ended up entering the supposedly
less preferred sealed bid first price auction even in situations in which they would expect to make
a higher net surplus (including the cost of the entry fee) by entering into the ascending instead.
That paper proposed one possible answer to the puzzle which involved assuming that bidders were
risk averse in their bidding behavior and then risk averse to the same degree in their auction choice
behavior. This explanation worked because neither risk averse nor approximately risk neutral
bidders should be expected to pay much to enter into an ascending auction instead of a sealed bid
first price auction just as we observed in the experiments. For the most risk averse bidders this is
because while they bid the highest in the first price auction and therefore expected little surplus in
the event that they win, they end up winning with higher probability than less risk averse bidders.
This is a trade-off risk averse bidders are willing to accept and consequently it is easy to show that
highly risk averse bidders should not be willing to pay much to get into the more lucrative, though
risky, ascending auction. At the other end of the range, bidders who were less risk averse bid lower
in the first price auction which means they expect a larger surplus when they win but it also means
that the expected surplus differential between the two formats is not so large. These less risk averse
bidders will pay a little to get into the ascending because of their lower probability of winning the
first price auction.
While this hypothesis of risk aversion was able to match with the data, applying risk aversion
to explain bidding in auction data is controversial. There is a long running debate among auction
theorists and experimental economists running back to Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982), Cox,
Smith, and Walker (1988) and Harrison (1989) regarding whether risk aversion is a reasonable
explanation for the bidding behavior in first price auctions. These papers led to a long round of
comment articles starting with the December 1992 issue of American Economic Review as well
as many other related papers. Many of the key points in this debate are summarized in Kagel
(1995). Because of the accumulation of so much doubt regarding whether the fundamental bidding
behavior itself can be well characterized by risk aversion there is certainly reason to suspect that
the compound hypothesis that risk aversion explains both the bidding behavior and the auction
choice behavior may ultimately be unsatisfying. This lead us to consider alternative explanations.
1Regret may occur in a first price auction when a bidder loses to a bid that is below their value as they may think
that if only they had bid higher, they could have won. Such a scenario should not reasonably occur in an ascending
auction.
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Perhaps the most plausible alternative is loss aversion. This model of decision making behavior
is suggested quite forcefully in Rabin and Thaler (2001) and Rabin (2000) as being superior to
risk aversion (at least when losses are possible). In our original experiment, losses were certainly
possible as anytime a subject entered an auction and failed to win, they still had to pay an entry
fee which led to a monetary loss. Even if they won, it was possible that they might not earn enough
to offset the cost of entry. If bidders are loss averse then we might observe subjects unwilling to
pay high entry fees because of the fact that this leads to larger possible losses. This is a highly
plausible explanation that our previous data could not reject.
Another reasonable alternative has to do with the difference in bidding structure between the
sealed bid first price (static) and ascending (dynamic) mechanisms. In the first price, a bidder
sends in a bid and they are done immediately. In the ascending auctions, bidders have to wait for
a while as the price clock ticks up which may take a more substantial amount of time. It could well
have been the case, for example, that while subjects substantially preferred the outcomes including
the implied risk involved in the ascending to the sealed bid and would have paid up to the expected
profit differential, they didn’t like the dynamic bidding process, i.e., were annoyed by the additional
length to an auction incurred by the use of a price clock2 or simply did not like the clock interface
itself. If bidders are impatient or have some other objection to the clock interface this represents a
set of preferences that we will refer to as “clock aversion” to indicate that they have some reason
to be averse to the clock.
In this paper, we will extend our experimental design to examine these two issues. To investigate
the possibility of loss aversion we will use a design similar to our previous one but instead of an
entry fee that both bidders are required to pay, we will use a surplus tax requiring only the winner
to pay a percentage of his surplus from the auction. This will eliminate the possibility of a loss
(unless a bidder bids above his value), but still allow us to vary the price of entering into an auction
to measure the willingness to pay of the subjects.
To determine the effect of the dynamic structure of the bidding process we will use our first
design but test bidder preferences between two static mechanisms; the first and second price sealed
bid auctions. Since the second price and ascending auctions are strategically equivalent this should
allow us to measure whether the observed preferences are based on the strategic nature of these
formats or on the mechanism of bid submission.3 We are aware of a significant literature finding
that while theoretically these mechanisms are equivalent, they are not equivalent behaviorally (e.g.
Kagel and Levin (1993) and Harstad (2000)). This finding does not invalidate the use of the
second price auction for our purposes. The issue we are examining is whether or not the subjects
have a negative view of the ascending auction based on the interface with which they are asked
to interact. The requirement then is that we find a mechanism that has the same bid submission
interface as the first price sealed bid format while leading to earnings that possess a similar mean
and variance to those in the ascending auction. The second price mechanism obviously satisfies
the first requirement and our data will show that it also satisfies the second requirement. An
alternative might have been to try varying the speed of the ascending auction. While that would
have perhaps allowed us identify the degree to which impatience might have impacted the revealed
preferences for formats, it would not have dealt with the issue of people who simply dislike the
2Evidence for impatience in laboratory auctions has been found in Isaac, Salmon, and Zillante (2005) suggesting
that it is plausible for one to see impatience even at this scale affecting behavior.
3While there are other settings for the check of the “clock” aversion hypothesis possible, our approach allow us
to answer two further intriguing questions: (i) Which auction mechanisms are favored if bidders have the possibility
to choose between two of the three standard auction formats used in the field - the sealed bid first price auction, the
ascending, and the sealed bid second price auction; (ii) Which aspects of the design, i.e., the structure of the bidding
process and/or the price rule, are important for this choice?
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nature of the clock interface. By keeping the interface constant between the first price and second
price auctions while also keeping the earnings roughly constant between the ascending and second
price formats we have the best chance at identifying any objection to the difference between bid
submission technologies of the first price and ascending auctions.
What we will find in both cases is that neither alternative explanation, i.e. loss aversion or
aversion to the dynamic bidding process, demonstrates any ability to provide an explanation of the
missing willingness to pay for the preferred ascending auction. In addition, the results will show
strong preferences for the second price rule, i.e., the ascending (English) and second price sealed
bid (Vickrey) auctions, compared to first price sealed bid auctions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section provide a complete design
of the experiments. In Section 3 we present the results and section 4 conclude.
2 Design of Experiments
As mentioned, in this study we use the experimental design first introduced in ISS. Due to that
and the fact that we will discuss some of the results from that paper in detail, we will explain
the design for the original experiments as well as the two new treatments. We will refer to these
treatments as the FPvA with entry price (or FPvA_EP), FPvA with surplus tax (FPvA_ST)
and FPvSP with entry price (FPvSP_EP). In all three treatments, the experiments were divided
into two distinct phases. The first phase, or the learning phase, had the subjects randomly paired
up to compete against each other in two auctions per round. In the two FPvA treatments the
two auction formats were a first price sealed bid and then an ascending clock auction while the
FPvSP treatment involved a first price sealed bid and a second price sealed bid auction. This phase
lasted for 10 rounds and all of the auctions consisted of two bidders. In each round the subjects
would participate in one of each auction type with the same value and against the same opponent.
The bidders possessed private values which were independent and randomly drawn from the set
V = {0, 1, 2, , ...99, 100} with all values vi ∈ V being equally likely. In all treatments the subjects
observed their value and then submitted a bid for the first price auction. Subjects could choose
integer bids between 0 and 150, which did allow them to overbid their highest possible value. All
values were denoted in a fictitious currency termed ECU for Experimental Currency Unit. Before
bidders were informed about the results of the first price auction, they participated in a second
auction. In the FPvA treatments this was a Japanese or ascending clock auction4 while in the
FPvSP treatment the second auction was a second price sealed bid auction which again just asked
them to submit a bid in the same range as for the first price. At the end of the round the bidders
observed a feedback—window specifying the results from both auction formats indicating whether
or not they won, the price paid by the winner in each auction, the private value of the buyer,
their own profit in the auction and their total profit in the current round. They were not given
cumulative profit numbers at the end of each round, only the gains/losses from the current round.
There were 10 participants in each experiment session and in each round subjects were randomly
re-paired to bid against a new opponent.
The intention for the learning phase was to allow subjects to practice both formats so that they
understood how to bid in them and so that they could form an understanding of the expected profits
in both and be able to form preferences between the two. The reason for having subjects play both
auctions with the same value was an attempt to minimize any negative impressions a bidder might
4The price started at 0 and began increasing at the rate of 1 ECU every 2 seconds. The auction concluded when
one of the bidders clicked on a button to indicate they were withdrawing from the auction with the remaining bidder
winning the auction at the price the first bidder dropped out at.
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receive about an auction format due to a random series of bad draws on one format while getting
good draws in the other. At the end of the learning phase there was a summary screen detailing
the average profit achieved by the winner across both auction types.5 The purpose of including
this information screen was to aid subjects in learning about the average actual profitability for
participating in the two mechanisms.
In the second phase of the experiment in all three treatments, the preference assessment phase,
the participants played an extended auction-selection game for 30 rounds. In a single round of
this phase, bidders were asked to choose to enter either of the two auction formats used in the
treatment, knowing that regardless of which they chose they would be competing against one other
bidder.6 In the two entry price treatments, both auction formats had an entry price attached to
choosing them which the bidder had to pay regardless of whether or not they won. In the surplus
tax treatment there was a tax level for each auction that indicated the percentage of the winner’s
surplus that they were obligate to pay. Bidders who lost an auction did not have to pay anything
in the surplus tax treatment.
The choice of which auction to enter was made before bidders observed their private value for
the auction. In the first 10 rounds of this phase, the entry fees or surplus taxes for both auction
formats were the same (1.40 ECU entry fee and 0% surplus tax). The preferred auction design was
identified for each individual as the one they chose in at least five rounds of these 10 rounds. Since
each subject was able to actually choose in only nine of the rounds, there was always at most one
format chosen five or more times. In the remaining 20 rounds, the entry price respectively surplus
tax for the preferred auction format was varied in each round while the less preferred format
retained the entry price of 1.40 ECU or the surplus tax of 0%.7 For the preferred auction format
in the entry fee treatments we used a grid consisting of entry prices ranging from 0.7 to 14 ECU
with an increment of 0.7. To avoid the possibility that the subjects would see the experiment as a
simple grid exercise and become bored or disinterested, the grid was not presented in an ascending
order, rather the order was randomized. To make the grid structure even less apparent, we added
an  to each element of the grid, where  is a random variable normally distributed on the range
(−.05, .05).8 Also, by not giving the grid in sequential order, we are able to do consistency checks
on the subjects’ choices that help to verify if they do have a consistent switch-over price. In the
surplus tax treatment, we engaged in a similar design as we used a grid of surplus taxes in the
range (0.04 to 0.80) in increments of 0.04 and again did not present them in a fixed ascending or
descending order.9
After subjects made their choices concerning the auction type, the round was played with 20%
probability. This was a session wide determination, not specific to any particular player. At the
end of each auction that was actually conducted, subjects were informed whether or not they won
5In the FPvA_EP treatment, there were two sessions where this screen was not shown. In ISS we tested whether
or not this screen affected the results and we found no evidence that it did.
6To guarantee that an even number of subjects participated in each mechanism, only 9 out of the 10 participants
were able to choose an auction type in each round. The 10th participant was automatically assigned to whichever
auction type had an odd number of people selecting it. The identity of the “10th” player was changed in each round,
so that each subject played the balancing role once every ten rounds and three times among the 30 rounds.
7 In the EP treatments all subjects entering an auction pay the entry fee. Therefore, having to pay a positive entry
fee for the chosen format versus having it for free (zero entry fee) can effect a subject’s decision by more than just
the difference in actual prices due to what is sometimes known as the “zero effect”. This is of particular concern if
subjects are loss averse. In the tax treatment only the winner pays the tax and no losses are possible. Both should
minimize any problems from a possible “zero effect”.
8The actual entry price order all subjects saw was {8.39, 2.10, 0.70, 4.92, 12.61, 1.42, 6.27, 4.20, 9.79, 11.15, 13.27,
5.59, 11.90, 9.07, 2.80, 10.49, 7.01, 3.50, 13.98, 7.74}.
9The actual sequence used was {0.48, 0.12, 0.04, 0.28, 0.72, 0.08, 0.36, 0.24, 0.56, 0.64, .0.76, 0.32, 0.68, 0.52, 0.16,
0.60, 0.40, 0.20, 0.80, 0.44}.
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Auction Auction Preference # of # of
Treatment Mechanism Formats Measure sessions subjects
FPvA_EP Static versus First price & Entry fee 6 60
Dynamic Ascending
FPvA_ST Static versus First price & Surplus tax 5 50
Dynamic Ascending
FPvSP_EP Static versus First price & Entry fee 5 50
Static Second price
Table 1: Summary of experimental sessions.
the auction, the price paid by the winner, the entry price/surplus tax they had to pay, their private
(reselling) value and their own payoff in the current round. An entry price was only charged to a
subject and a surplus tax was only charged to the winner if the auction was conducted.
Altogether we conducted 16 sessions for this study with a total of 160 subjects: In six sessions
we studied FP versus A auction with entry prices and in further five sessions with surplus tax;
finally, we ran additional five sessions for the comparison FP versus SP sealed bid auctions. Table
1 summarizes the characteristics of our experimental design.
All experimental sessions were computerized. The software programs were created with the use
of the software system z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999)). All experiments were conducted at Humboldt-
University, Berlin and most participants were students of economics or business administration.
They had been invited by leaflets to participate in an experiment announced to last about two
hours which turned out to be approximately accurate. The conversion rate of the ECU earned by
each subject into cash was: 1 ECU = 0.04 EUR ( this ranged between US$0.035 to US$0.039 at the
time the experiments were conducted). Subjects’ total earnings ranged between 5 EUR to 28.50
EUR with a mean of 15.85 EUR (including a fixed participation fee of 2.50 EUR).
3 Results
The original experiment was the FPvA_EP treatment. As shown in table 2 the average number
of times the ascending auction was chosen was 7.87 with a median of 9 while the corresponding
numbers were 1.13 and 0 for the first price auction. Since one subject was held out from choosing
in each of the rounds of this phase and there were 10 total rounds in which subjects chose between
auction formats with equal entry prices, each subject made 9 choices. Since the median number
of times the ascending was chosen was 9, this represents a strong tendency for subjects to choose
it exclusively. In total, 39 (of 60) subjects chose the ascending auction exclusively while there was
only one subject choosing the first price auction exclusively. In fact only 5 out of the 60 subjects
chose the first price auction more often than the ascending. This preference for the ascending or
second price auction transfers to the other two treatments. Over all of the treatments, there were
only two subjects (out of 160) choosing the first price auction exclusively, one in FPvA_EP and one
in FPvA_ST, while 98 subjects chose the ascending or the SP auction exclusively, 39 in FPvA_EP,
32 in FPvA_ST and 27 in FPvSP_EP. Only 17 out of the 160 subjects chose the first price more
often than the ascending (5 in each of the A-treatments and 7 in the SP treatment).
One immediate reason this preference for the ascending auction might exist can be found in
the middle columns of table 2 which contain the average surplus to the winner in the FP and
then the A/SP auctions. In every case, subjects made less profit in the FP than the comparison
auction. The last two columns contain the benchmark predictions for surplus the subjects would
6
Number of Choices Average Theoretical
(Phase 2: Round 1-10) Winner’s Surplus Winner’s Surplus
Average Median (Phase 1) (Phase 1)
Treatment FP A/SP FP A/SP FP A/SP FP A/SP
FPvA_EP 1.13 7.87 0 9 19.32 37.02 33.28 37.64
FPvA_ST 1.26 7.74 0 9 16.48 34.18 34.34 33.12
FPvSP_EP 1.54 7.46 0 9 11.84 31.70 34.34 33.12
Table 2: Summary of entry choices in the first 10 rounds of phase 2 and average winner surplus
from phase 1.
earn based on the standard risk neutral bid predictions.10 As expected, subjects do just about
as well as the theory predicts in the A and SP auctions, but receive much lower earnings due to
overbidding in the FP auctions. This strong preference served as a strong foundation for the rest
of the experiment designed to determine how much subjects were willing to pay to enter into the
more lucrative auction.
Figure 1 shows a characterization of how much the subjects were willing to pay for their most
preferred auction in the original FPvA_EP treatment by displaying a pseudo demand curve indi-
cating how many subjects were willing to choose the ascending auction at each entry price. This
pseudo demand curve exhibits the standard characteristics of a normal demand curve. It shows that
as the entry price increases, the number of subjects demanding entry into the A auction decreases.
The pseudo demand curve is a bit jagged, however, indicating that there are some bidders making
choices that are not purely monotonic. For example, a subject may have declined to pay a price
of 2.1 for the ascending auction, but agreed to pay a price of 2.8 or 3.5. This is also partially an
artifact of not allowing one person to choose at each price.
As shown in table 2, average profit to winners from the ascending auctions was 37.02 while it
was 19.32 for the first price auction.11 This implies a difference of 17.70. If subjects expected to win
half the time, this implies an expected profit differential of 17.70/2=8. 85. Thus, if subjects are risk
neutral and care only about maximizing expected profits then they should choose the ascending
auction at any price that is less than 8.85 ECU above that of the base entry price for the FP. Since
the base price for the FP is 1.40 ECU this means the break-even entry price is at 10.25 and this is
represented in the figure by the dotted line. At any entry price below this line average net profits
in the ascending are larger than the average net profits in the first price sealed bid auction given
its static entry price of 1.4. At any price above this line, the first price yields higher net profits.
The key point to note is that only 9 out of the 60 subjects (15%) were willing to pay up to this
point to get into the ascending auction.
This result is something of an anomaly as the stated preferences of the subjects were heavily in
favor of the ascending auction. As shown in table 2 at equal entry prices, choice of the ascending
was nearly unanimous. Further, subjects were given the requisite information on the expected
profit differential between the two formats since they were informed at the end of the first phase
about the session wide average profit achieved by the winner across both auction types. Why then
10Note we used the same value pairings in the FPvA_ST and FPvSP_EP treatments accounting for the identical
theoretical predictions. We used a different set of values for the FPvA_EP treatment which delivered the oddly high
surplus prediction for the ascending auction. As will be obvious below, the overall results in that treatment were not
impacted by this difference in values.
11These numbers are average profits to winners from the first phase. If we look at the numbers for all auctions
from both phases, excluding any entry price payments, the results are 37.02 and 19.78
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Figure 1: Pseudo demand curve for the FPvA_EP treatment indicating the realtive share of
subjects choosing the ascending auction format at each entry price.
would they not be willing to pay up to the expected profit differential to get into the ascending
auction?
It was proposed in ISS that this is explainable by risk aversion. The key point of the explanation
is that neither risk averse nor approximately risk neutral subjects should theoretically be willing to
pay much to get into the ascending auction. The risk neutral bidders should not pay much as their
surplus is approximately equal between the two when they win (they should pay something because
they expect to win less often in the first price) while the highly risk averse should not pay much
because they are willing to trade off the lower surplus in the first price for the higher probability
of winning.12 While the story and the predictions were shown to fit the observations, there are
alternative theories that could also fit the story and likely be shown to fit the observations.
3.1 Loss Aversion versus Risk Aversion
The alternative hypothesis that appears most likely to provide an explanation for the observed
phenomenon is loss aversion. A subject who possesses loss averse preferences would be expected to
avoid the auction mechanism with the higher entry price due to the fact that this makes it possible
for the subject to lose money upon entry. Our FPvA_ST treatment was designed to test whether
or not loss aversion could explain the behavior. In this version of the experiment, the subjects
pay nothing when they lose an auction and when they win they pay a fraction of their surplus.
Assuming a subject never bids above his value, he can not lose money in this design.
An important theoretical point that should be made is that due to the implementation of the
tax, the equilibrium bidding behavior is unchanged under any assumption of risk preferences in the
ascending case and under reasonable ones in the first price case. This is immediately obvious for
the ascending auction because the equilibrium strategy does not depend on risk preferences and is
12Bidders who are more risk averse than others have a higher probability of winning because for a given value, they
will bid higher than a bidder less risk averse.
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for a bidder to stay in so long as they have positive surplus. Since the tax is based on a percentage
of the surplus, the bidder still expects positive surplus at any price less than their value. In the
first price auction, the result can be seen in that the utility maximization problem is
max
r
U((1− t) ∗ (v − b∗(r))) ∗ F (r)
with the equilibrium condition that the derivative must equal 0 where r = v. If one uses the CRRA
utility function, U(x) = xα, it is quite easy to show that the tax has no impact on the equilibrium.13
This is sensible because all the tax does is re-scale the value in the function and with CRRA this
has no impact on the degree of risk aversion.14
As shown in the second row of table 2 the average winner’s profit in the phase I ascending
auctions was 34.18 while it was 16.48 for the first price auctions. If subjects were risk neutral for
gains then they should be willing to pay up to the tax that makes their average profits between the
two auctions equal, i.e., they should be willing to pay up to a tax of t that solves 16.48 = (1−t)34.18
or 0.52. This is true even if they are risk loving in the loss domain as suggested by loss aversion.
Figure 2 shows the pseudo demand curve derived from this experiment indicating the number of
subjects willing to pay each possible tax on their winnings for the ascending auction. The dotted
line shows the break even tax or the tax at which expected profits between the two formats are
equal. As in the first experiment, we find that fewer than 10 subjects, namely 9 out of 50 (18%)
were willing to pay up to this point to enter the ascending auction. Since it is impossible for losses
to be involved in this case, it is impossible for the pattern of behavior depicted in figure 2 to be
explained by loss aversion. Since the pattern of behavior observed in figure 1 is practically identical,
we can conclude that loss aversion seems to have played no significant role in the unwillingness of
subjects to pay the fixed entry price to enter the ascending auction in the first treatment.
3.2 Dynamic versus Static Bidding Process
Another alternative explanation for why subjects were willing to pay so little for the ascending
auction in the first original experiment is that they disliked the dynamic bidding process, i.e., the
extra time involved in conducting an ascending auction. While they may have liked the outcomes
13The derivation is as follows. The first order condition is:
F 0(r)U((1− t) ∗ (v − b∗(r)))− (1− t)b0∗(r)U 0((1− t) ∗ (v − b∗(r)))F (r) = 0
b0∗(r) =
U((1− t) ∗ (v − b∗(r)))
(1− t) ∗ U 0((1− t) ∗ (v − b∗(r)))
F 0(r)
F (r)
If we use U(x) = xα then
b0∗(r) =
((1− t) ∗ (v − b∗(r)))α
(1− t) ∗ α ∗ ((1− t) ∗ (v − b∗(r)))α−1
F 0(r)
F (r)
=
((1− t) ∗ (v − b∗(r)))
(1− t) ∗ α
F 0(r)
F (r)
=
((v − b∗(r)))
α
F 0(r)
F (r)
which is the standard form for the differential equation defining the bid function in first price auctions without the
tax.
14 If subjects possess a different form of risk aversion, such as CARA, then this will impact equilibrium behavior.
CRRA, however, is a legitimate assumption because Matthews (1987) shows that the form of risk aversion consistent
with preferring the ascending auction is DARA which CRRA satisfies.
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Figure 2: Pseudo demand curve in the FPvA_ST treatment indicating the realtive share of
subjects choosing the ascending auction format at each level of surplus tax.
better, they were just annoyed about the additional time it took to get to them and this annoyance
with the bidding procedure decreased their willingness to pay to something below the break-even
price. Since the outcomes between the second price and the ascending formats should be equivalent,
we can check this hypothesis about the effect of the dynamic structure of the bidding process by
comparing the sealed bid first price and the sealed bid second price auctions using the original
entry price design in the FPvSP treatment.
Of course a maintained hypothesis underlying this comparison is that subjects view the second
price and ascending auctions as equivalent in terms of outcomes. This is an issue widely discussed
in the literature due to the repeated findings of overbidding in second price sealed bid auctions.
We conducted one session of a bridge treatment in which we compared the SP and A mechanisms.
Profit in Phase I was approximately equivalent between both mechanisms, 32.12 for the SP and
31.50 for the A with standard deviations of 23.4 and 19.9 respectively. Standard distribution tests
all fail to find a significant difference in the underlying distributions of bidder profits (p−values of
0.8867, 0.8146 and 0.9667 from t−test, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
Perhaps due to the slight but statistically insignificant profit advantage in the SP, it was chosen
5.3 times on average compared to 3.7 for the A in the first 10 rounds of phase II. In rounds 11-
30 of phase II when they are asked to pay for their more preferred mechanism, subjects in the
aggregate chose the higher priced mechanism a total of 8 times out of 180 possible choices and 5
of these 8 choices were situations in which the more expensive mechanism cost 2.1 or 2.8 ECUs
while the cheaper mechanism cost 1.4 ECUs. The implication is that while there might be a slight
preference for the SP on a ceteris paribus basis, this preference is not strong enough to induce
virtually any payment of a positive price. This is actually a first piece of evidence showing that
the bid submission mechanism is unlikely to explain our A vs FP results. The key point though is
that the earnings distributions are highly comparable which provides evidence that the SP is close
enough to the A in that respect for it to be able to serve in the capacity we require for our test
against the FP.
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Figure 3: Pseudo demand curve in the FPvsSP_EP treatment indicating the realtive share of
subjects choosing the ascending auction format at each level of entry price.
In our FPvSP treatment, when subjects were allowed to choose to enter one of the two auction
formats for the same price they overwhelmingly preferred the second price over the first price
auction. In total, 27 (of 50) subjects chose the second price auction exclusively while no subject
chose the first price exclusively. Altogether only 7 out of 50 subjects chose to enter the first price
auction more often than the alternative.
According to the third row of Table 2 the average winner’s profit for the phase I second price
auctions was 31.70 while it was 11.84 for the first price. Given that the static entry price for the
first price was 1.4 and that subjects only expect to win half of the time, to find the entry price, e,
for the ascending that yields equivalent average profits, we must solve (31.7)/2−e = (11.84)/2−1.4
which yields e = 11.33. This tells us that if subjects are willing to pay up to the entry price that
yields equivalent average profits between the two formats, they should be willing to pay up to 11.33.
Figure 3 shows the pseudo demand curve derived from the sessions of the FPvSP_EP treatment
with the dotted line once more indicating the break-even price. Once more we see that just under
10 subjects (9 out of 50) or 18% are willing to pay up to this point. and all other characteristics
of both figures 1 and 2 are duplicated in this figure. This shows a fairly strong indication that the
structure of the bidding process had little effect on the preferences of the subjects.
It is worthwhile to comment on the very low average earnings our subjects realized in the FP
auctions in this treatment. We attribute this to a bias in the learning process introduced by having
the subjects engage in the same mechanical bidding process for both formats so close together in
Phase I.15 Due to the difference in the process, this effect did not occur in the FPvA treatments, but
in the FPvSP treatment it took some subjects longer to learn to bid their value in one mechanism
while bidding well below their value in the other. While we understand this was a less than desirable
side effect in certain respects, the effect works against the finding. This bias to overbidding the
15Harstad (2000) has observed that when playing back-to-back different auction formats subjects often transform
the experience gained from the one auction to the other. In his experiments, for example, subjects tend to overbid
less in second-price auctions if they first gain experience in first-price auctions.
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Figure 4: Pseudo demand curve of all treatments
risk neutral level even more than usual in the FP auction should have made the SP even more
desirable to bidders who were basically risk neutral but for some reason could not stop themselves
from bidding too high in the FP. The evidence, however, is that the subjects were no more willing
to pay for the SP auction in this environment than they were for the A auction before.
3.3 Summary
Putting the results of all treatments together in figure 4 shows that the three pseudo demand
curves are almost identical. The figure is likely difficult to even read due to how much the lines
overlap.16 The null hypothesis of no differences between the choices in the three experiments cannot
be rejected (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; p>0.3). In fact, the structure of all pseudo demand curves
is truly striking. In all three cases, there is a very flat slope at the bottom of the line indicating that
some subjects stop picking the ascending auction very quickly upon seeing the price respectively
tax rise while there are about 4-5 subjects that are willing to pay practically anything to enter into
the ascending or the second price auction. Fewer than 10 subjects in each treatment (15-18%) are
willing to pay more than the level that equalizes the expected profit of the two auctions. Neither loss
aversion nor aversion to the time consuming dynamic bidding procedure are capable of explaining
the low willingness to pay for the preferred ascending or second price auction
Another characterization of the willingness to pay of the subjects for their most preferred
auction would be to estimate a switch-over point in terms of entry prices and surplus taxes for
each of the subjects by finding the price at which each subject would switch from choosing the
ascending /second price sealed bid auction to the first price sealed bid auction. For subjects who
exhibited perfectly consistent behavior, this estimation is trivial. For the other subjects who were
not monotonic in their choice behavior, it amounts to finding the price that best divides the observed
16Since the FPvA_ST treatments had prices measured in different units than the other two, we could be accused of
manipulating the overlap of it by our choice of axis scale for it. The axes were, however constructed so that the price
increments were horizontally aligned across all treatments. This seemed the least manipulative way of presenting the
information.
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choice behavior. The full technical details on how this is done for the EP treatments can be found
in ISS. For the ST treatment, the procedure is analogous and amounts to finding the tax that best
describes when the subject switches from choosing the ascending auction to the sealed bid.
The average prices that lead people to switch from the ascending to the first price auction are
6.33 in the FPvA_EP treatment and 7.32 for the FPvSP_EP treatment while the average profit
differences between the two institutions were 8. 85 and 9.93 leading to implied switch-over prices
of 10. 25 and 11.33 respectively if the subjects were only concerned about average profits. The
corresponding numbers for the FPvA_ST treatment are an average switch-over tax of 0.35 and
average profit difference between the two auction formats of 0.52. This is simply a different way
of characterizing the same point made in a simpler and more elegant manner with the pseudo-
demand curves. It is quite clear that in none of these treatments were subjects willing to pay
an entry price or surplus tax up to the level that would equalize profits. Most subjects started
choosing the FP auction at prices for the A or SP at which the latter two were still more profitable
than the FP. They did this when we eliminated the possibility of losses and when we equalized the
bid submission procedure leaving the only differences between the mechanisms the fundamental
strategic differences as well as the differences in risk.
4 Conclusion
This paper began with a puzzling result found in Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) that while
subjects seem to like ascending auctions more than first price auctions, they were not willing to
pay entry prices to enter into an ascending auction rather than a first price that would have left
the ascending auction more profitable than the first price. This is an intriguing finding and it
is important to understand it if we are to have a complete understanding of how bidders choose
among competing auctions.
We had previously proposed risk aversion as a possible solution and found that it could provide a
reasonable match with the data. Due to the acknowledged difficulties with this solution, we sought
out alternative explanations. Here we advanced two further possible solutions to the anomaly.
The first was that subjects feared making losses due to the fact that they had to pay the entry
fee regardless of whether or not they won the auction. We replaced the entry fee with a surplus
tax which could not cause a loss and we observed exactly the same phenomenon of subjects being
unwilling to pay surplus taxes at which the ascending auction would still be more profitable than
the sealed bid auction. Our second solution was based on the possibility that the subjects could
have been impatient or possessed some other aversion to the dynamic bidding mechanism used in
the ascending auction. While we found some small evidence of such a disutility in a session we
conducted comparing ascending and second price auctions, when we compared second price with
first price auctions using the entry price design we again found the same result as we did with our
original experiments. Subjects began choosing the first price auction at prices for the second price
would still have lead to the second price being the more profitable. This is an amazing consistency
of results across quite different treatments.
With the failure of these two alternative explanations this leaves our original explanation of
risk aversion as the only unfalsified explanation. It is of course possible that other forces could be
driving both the bidding behavior and the auction choice behavior than risk aversion and due to
the many other studies finding that risk aversion may have difficulty capturing certain elements of
bidding behavior it is certainly worth continuing to search for alternatives.
The overall importance of the issue of how bidders might choose between alternative auctions
is of course substantial. The main interest of an auctioneer would take one of two paths. One
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might be for an auctioneer to attempt to take advantage of any preference bidders have for his
mechanism by charging an entry price. In Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004b), we show that this
will not be possible. Alternatively, once bidders are allowed to choose which auction to enter, an
auctioneer using a more preferred mechanism might be able to increase his profits due to increased
entry. If we make the assumption that the bidders in our experiments were guided by risk aversion
and allow for the fact that there may be some utility for the ascending auction or disutility for the
first price due to cognitive differences between the two then we can show that many of our subjects
would have been willing to choose to enter into ascending auctions with 2, 3 or more other bidders
rather than a first price auction with only a single other bidder for competition.17 Because revenue
is quickly rising as n rises for low numbers of bidders, this suggests an auctioneer may benefit from
running a more preferred mechanism in this manner if the rise in n compensates for the lack of
overbidding. The results we present here further solidify our prior results regarding the existence of
strong preferences for auctions using a second price rule, e.g. the ascending and second price sealed
bid auctions, compared to first price sealed bid auctions. This leads to an important implication for
auctioneers which is that choice of an auction format may have important implications for bidder
turnout. Since the competition for the pool of potential buyers can be fierce in certain markets, an
auctioneer may be able to choose a format more likely to encourage bidder participation and thus
achieve an increase in revenue. Our current results are suggestive that the choice of the ascending
auction over a first price auction could accomplish such a goal. We explore that implication further
in Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2005).
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